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THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY TO-DAY
Forty years ago a paper entitled "The Right To Privacy"'
appeared in the Harvard Law Review.2 In that article, which
has been called one of the classical examples of creative juristic
effort, 3 the right to privacy, a new category in the law of torts,
was suggested. The article became the fountain-head of dis-
,eussion, comment, criticism, litigation, and even legislation.
Forty years having passed, perhaps the time has now arrived
for a re-examination of "this new chapter in the law of torts,''
sufficient decisions involving the right having been made to
justify such an examination.
It is the purpose of this paper to make such a study. An
analysis of the problem will be attempted, and the leading cases
will be examined at length. Although it will be necessary to
inquire into the substantive right of privacy, the emphasis will
be placed upon the remedial side of the problem. This latter
question will involve a consideration of whether equity protects
personal rights as such, in the absence of a property right, upon
which to base the relief. In connection with this question it
will be found fitting to inquire whether, if the substantive right
itself has been able in some jurisdictions in these forty years to
'The following citations will be found helpful in a consideration
of this problem: The Right To Privacy, Warren and Brandeis, 4 Har.
L. Rev. 193; The Right of Privacy, Ragland, 17 Ky. L. J. 85; The
Right To Privacy Today, note, 43 Har. L. Rev. 297; The Right of
Privacy, and Its Relation to the Law of Libel, Adams, 39 Am. L. Rev.
37; Right of Privacy and Equity Relief, Edwards, 55 Cent. L. J. 123;
3 Mich. L. Rev. 559; 2 Col. L. Rev. 437.
'4 Har. L. Rev. 193.
"'What may almost be called the classical example (of creative
activity) is the paper on the Right of Privacy in which Mr. Justice
Brandeis, then at the bar, was a collaborator. A bit of juristic reason-
ing on the analogy of the legal rights that secure other interests of
personality, showing that there was an interest or claim to privacy as
a part of personality, and postulating a legal order that secures per-
sonality completely, created first discussion, then a conflict of decisions,
and finally through decision or statute, a new chapter in the law of
torts." Pound, Interpretations of Legal History, 137.
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acquire an independent status, apart from those fictions which
attend the early development of any branch of the law, the
time has not come when the remedial phase of the problem
should be relieved in a similar manner of its fictional encum-
brances.
Let us suppose that a court of equity is confronted with a
request for an injunction based upon a violation of the "right
of privacy." There are several questions which the court will
find it necessary to consider in deciding the case. An analysis
of these questions will aid us in a consideration of the problem.
These questions are, first, Is there such a thing as a substantive
right of privacy, which finds any sort of protection in ozur law?
If the court answers this question in the affirmative, it is then
necessary to consider, second, Will equity lend its aid in protect-
ing this right by injunction? The answer to the second ques-
tion is dependent upon several points:
1. Is the remedy at law adequate?
2. Is it necessary that a property right be invol.ved?
3. Is it expedient to grant relief by injunction?
I. Is there such a thing as a substantive right of privacy,
which finds any sort of protection in our law?
(a) Recognition of the substantive right at law.
It may be stated that in a few states there is such a thing
as a substantive right of privacy the violation of which gives
rise to a tort action for damages. While the actual cases which
decide the question are relatively few in number and come from
few jurisdictions they accept the right and cannot in any sense
be summarily dismissed as sports. On the other hand, a few
jurisdictions have definitely rejected the right as unknown to
the common law. Most states have not, as yet, passed upon the
question.
For convenience, the discussion of the cases which accept or
reject the substantive right will be considered as follows:
(1) Cases which accept the right and reasons therefor.
(2) Cases which reject the right and reasons therefor.
Apparently, four jurisdictions have accorded the right of
privacy a common law standing-Georgia in 1905 and again in
1924, Kentucky in 1909 and again in 1912 and 1927, Mssouri
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in 1911 and Kansas in 1918. Louisiana, a civil law state, recog-
nized the right in 1905. Four states have definitely refused to
accept it as a common law substantive right-Michigan in 1899,
New York in 1902, Rhode Island in 1909 and Washington in
1911.
These decisions and the courts' reasons for the acceptance
or rejection of the right will now be examined.
(1) Cases which accept the right and the reasons therefor.
In Pavesich v. New Englavd Life Ins. Co.5 the petition con-
tained two counts, one for a libel, and the other for a violation
of the plaintiff's right of privacy. The court considered that
the plaintiff was entitled to have the question of libel submitted
to the jury. The court further considered that the right of
privacy count was not subject to a general demurrer as not set-
ting forth a cause of action. The decision cannot be taken as
other than a complete recognition of the substantive right of
privacy, and has been consistently accepted as such by the
courts.
The facts of the case are interesting. The defendants pub-
lished a likeness of the plaintiff, which would be easily recog-
nized by his friends and acquaintances, in a newspaper as a
part of an insurance advertisement. Above the picture were
the words: "Do it now. The man who did." By the side of
the plaintiff's picture was the likeness of an ill-dressed and
sickly looking person. Above this picture were the words: "Do
it while you can. The man who didn't." Below the two pic-
tures were the words: "These two pictures tell their own
story." The plaintiff's name was not used. The picture of the
plaintiff had been obtained from a photographer without plain-
tiff's consent or knowledge. The court might have considered
breach of trust, but this was not alleged, and the court faced
squarely the count for the violation of the right of privacy,
which was before it.
The rationale of the court's decision is not difficult. It
considered that a right of privacy is a right derived from nat-
ural law, 6 "recognized by the principles of municipal law and
5122 Ga. 190, 50 S. E. 68 (1905). See comments on the case, 3
Mich. L. Rev. 559; 18 Har. L. Rev. 625.
6 "The individual surrenders to society many rights and privileges
which he would be free to exercise in a state of nature, in exchange
for the benefits which he receives as a member of society. But he Is
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guaranteed to persons in this state both by the Constitutions of
the United States and of the State of Georgia, in those pro-
visions which declare that no person shall be deprived of liberty
except by due process of law.''7 What about the natural laws
as a repository of legal principles? Of course change or growth
in the law must come from some source other than by legislative
enactment if there is to be appreciable progress. It was at one
time thought that such growth came by way of natural law, a
superior body 6f legal principles, into which judges could dip to
correct and supplement the existing law. The present view is
to consider the common law as sufficiently flexible to adapt itself
to a changing world, to adjust itself to and recognize those
rights which a proper consideration of history, custom and the
demands of social, economic and moral progress requireY The
not presumed to surrender all those rights, and the public has no more
right without his consent, to invade the domain of those rights which
it is necessarily to be presumed that he has reserved, than he has to
violate the valid regulations of the organized government under which
he lives. The right of privacy has its foundations in the instincts of
nature. It is recognized intuitively, consciousness being the witness
that can be called to establish its existence. Any person whose intellect
is in a normal condition recognizes at once that as to each member of
society there are matters private, and there are matters public so far
as the individual is concerned. Each individual as instinctively resents
an encroachment by the public upon his rights which are of a private
nature as he does the withdrawal of those of his rights which are of a
public nature. A right of privacy in matters purely private is there-
fore derived from natural law." Id. 69.
7 I. 71.
8 "Natural law, the great agency of juristic development of law, is a
fiction of a superior body of legal principles, existing in reason, of
which the actual body of law is but an imperfect reflection and by
which, therefore, the actual law may be corrected and supplemented.
The theory is an expression of the jurisconsult's desire to improve and
to add to the existing legal materials, in order to achieve definite ends
in litigation, without impairing confidence in the law as of unchallenge-
able authority and in such a way as to persuade tribunals to accept
his results." Pound, Interpretations of Legal History, 133.
9 "The materials which the court will first examine in its search for
the rule to be applied are prior judicial decisions. If it finds an appli-
cable precedent, it will ordinarily determine the controversy according-
ly; if it can find no previous adjudication on all fours with the case In
hand, it will try to ascertain whether any available decisions have
sufficient elements in common with it to require or justify an applica-
tion of the rule used therein. If it finds a precedent squarely in point
or applicable by analogy, but determines nevertheless that it ought not
to be followed, or if it finds no pertinent precedent, it ought to and
generally will, decide the case as it believes a proper consideration of
history, custom, morals, and sound public policy require. Obviously
in this process it does and must resort not only to judicial decisions
of non-common law courts, but also to non-legal materials; It gives due
weight, in so far as it is able, to the known truths of all the sciences
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relation between the common law and natural law is a problem
for the philosophically inclined, but to say the least natural law
as a basis for the recognition of rights, has fallen into disfavor.
Itzkovitch v. Whitaker'0 decided the same year in Louisi-
ana, which has inherited the civil law instead of the com-
mon law of England, held that an injunction would be granted
to restrain a police officer from placing in the rogues' gallery
the photograph of a prisoner not convicted of crime, who
alleged that he was innocent and an honest citizen. The court
said :11
"Every one who does not violate the law can insist upon being let
alone (the right of privacy). In such a case the right of privacy is
absolute. It must be said that there is some limit to this right, which
it Is not necessary to discuss in this case. A person may be arrested,
imprisoned, and acquitted, without right to damages. All of this is
true, but it bears no application to the issue in hand. Where a person
is not guilty, is honest (and that is the only light upon which to con-
sider this case with the issues before us) he may obtain an injunction
to prevent his photograph from being sent to the rogues' gallery. He
has the personal right to the restraining order, at least for the time
being. The theory in opposition to this view is substantially that the
picture should be taken and exhibited for the public good. There can
be no public good subserved by taking the photograph of an honest
man for the purpose before mentioned. The court had jurisdiction to
Issue the preliminary injunction, and to make it perpetual if the evi-
dence justifies the decree."
It is interesting to consider whether several paragraphs
near the end of the opinion in the case affect or limit the above
statement. At that point the court said:
"There are decisions of recent date on the subject of the 'law of
privacy,' especially Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., (N. Y.) 64
N. E. 442 ........ The decisions to which it has given rise are
lengthy and interesting. We have read them only to arrive at the
conclusion that they are not germane to the subject to which we have
here given attention." (Italics are ours.)
The language quoted first from the opinion would indicate
that the court had considered the right of privacy germane to
the subject under discussion. Consequently this language
coming later in the same opinion is confusing. When the case
affecting human experience and human conduct. The resort to non-
legal materials is not confined to the solution of common law problems;
it Is made, though perhaps to a less degree, in the interpretation and
application of statutes." Morgan, The Study of Law, Chapter II,
Nature And Sources of Law, at page 29.
" 115 La. 479, 39 So. 499 (1905).
Ic. 500.
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was before the court again eleven months later1 2 the right of
privacy, as such, was not mentioned. The court did say at that
time that rights exclusively personal could be protected by in-
junction and affimed its position that placing the picture of
one accused but not convicted of crime in the rogues' gallery,
should be enjoined.
Apparently the court by its language merely meant that
cases like Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., which denied
relief, were not in point with Itzoviteh v. Whitaker, where relief,
in the opinion of the court, should be given. At least, the same
court in the subsequent case of Schulman v. Whitaker,13 which
involved like facts, and was written by the same judge, speak-
ing for the court, once more gave relief. The opinions, poorly
written as they are, seem to recognize the right of privacy, and
there are others who have been in accord with the writer in this
conclusion. 14 The rationale of the court's decision in the
Pavesich case is not difficult, since the court attempted to reason
out a justification for the protection of the right of privacy.
This was not done in the Itzkovitch case. The court's reasons
for protecting the right are not stated and so are unknown.
The first Kentucky case to recognize the right of privacy
was Foster-Milburn Co. v. Chinn..' The defendant published
in an advertising pamphlet a forged testimonial of a patent
medicine purported to be signed by the plaintiff, Col. J. P.
Chinn, a prominent resident of Harrodsburg, Kentucky. It
read: "I join in endorsing Doan's Kidney Pills ..... A few
boxes effectually routed my ailment, and I am glad to acknowl-
edge the benefit I have derived." Col. Chinn's picture was also
1 2117 La. 708, 42 So. 228 (1906).
1115 La. 628, 39 So. 737 (1905), 117 La. 704, 42 So. 227 (1906).
" See, for example, 43 Har. L. Rev. 297, 298 (1929). Accord, 17
Ky. L. J. 85, 104, where Prof. Ragland Says: "While not all of these
cases have been placed squarely on the right of privacy, and while it
has been doubted whether any of them should have been so placed, it
is undeniable that some of the more important of them were so placed
by the courts."
"134 Ky. 424, 120 S. W. 364 (1909). The case was before the
Court of Appeals again in 137 Ky. 843, 127 S* W. 476 (1910). The
Foster-Milburn Company refused to pay the judgment. Suit was brought
in the Federal Court at Buffalo, N. Y. and the decision of the Kentucky
Court of Appeals was sustained, 195 Fed. 158 (1912). The defendant
took an appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals, where the judgment
was again upheld, 202 Fed. 175 (1913). For a discussion of the case
see Smith, 4 Ky. L. J. No. 3, 22; Wigmore, 4 Ky. L. J. No. 8, 3.
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used. There was a notorious custom of selling such testimonials
and Col. Chinn spurred by the raillery of his friends and the
insinuations of his enemies was highly indignant. He brought
suit asking for $25,000 damages, charging that he had neither
written, signed nor authorized the testimonial nor the publica-
tion of his picture and that it had brought him into ridicule
and otherwise damaged him. The court held that it was a
question for the jury to determine whether the plaintiff had
been subjected to disgrace, ridicule, odium or contempt. If the
jury so found, it would follow that there was a libel and
damages would lie. But the court went further and held that
the plaintff could recover although the jury might find that
he had not been subjected to disgrace, ridicule, odium or
contempt, because of a violation of his right of privacy, where
recovery may be had without proof of special damages. This
distinction between libel and the right of privacy should be
emphasized. As pointed out by the authors in the original article
in the Harvard Law Review, an action of tort for damages lies
in all cases for violation of the right of privacy without showing
special damages.' 0 In order for the plaintiff to recover in libel
"It is necessary to keep in mind that special damages may be of
two kinds. In the one case special damages must be shown before
there is a substantive right of action; in the other case, and this is
the usual use of the phrase, special damages are additional damages
over the ordinary loss which plaintiff has suffered. It is to special
damages as a necessary element in the substantive right of action to
which reference is here made rather than as "additional damages."
The difference in the two kinds of special damages is shown by the
following extracts:
"In fact special damages may be of two kinds: First, in certain
classes of cases, such damages must be shown in order that there be
any substantive right of action at all, as for instance in certain forms
of slander; and, second, in the ordinary case above stated, where addi-
tional damages over the ordinary loss which is presumed are being
claimed by the plaintiff." Clark on Code Pleading, page 228.
"ISLA-NDr AND LmEr. . . . Where the defamatory words are
considered, by reason of their serious nature, to be 'actionable per se'
it Is not necessary to set forth special damages in order to recover;
but, where the words are not actionable per so the special loss to the
plaintiff must be alleged with particularity." Mid. page 217.
See also the following statement:
"But even In these jurisdictions the plaintiffs could not have recov-
ered for since the publication was not libelous per se, special damages
had to be proved." 41 Har. I,. Rev. 1071.
See, also, the following:
"SPEcIAL. DAMAGEs DEFnEm. Special damages are such as the law
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in the principal case which is not a case of libel per se, it would
be necessary to show that he had been subjected to ridicule,
contempt or odium. This would not be necessary to recover
for a violation of the right of privacy. Simply to show that
the testimonial was published without his consent for the ex-
ploitation of the defendant's business would be sufficient. It
follows that the plaintiff could recover for a violation of the
right of privacy where a libel did not exist. A fortiori a recog-
nition of the right of privacy as a substantive right marks an
extension of the law in the protection of full personality. The
value of this case which explicitly recognizes the right is thus
apparent.
The extension in the protection of full personality which
the right of privacy gives, not given under the existing law of
libel where truth is a defense, is further illustrated in the sub-
sequent Kentucky case of Brents v. Morgan. 7 In that case de-
fendant caused a notice five feet by eight feet to be placed in a
show window stating that "Dr. Mlorgan owes an account here of
$49.67. And if promises would pay an account this account
would have been settled long ago. This account will be adver-
tised as long as it remains unpaid." It was held that this
was not actionable as a libel since truth is a defense in Ken-
tucky. But the court held that it was a violation of Dr. lor-
gan's right of privacy for which an action could be sustained
will not infer from the nature of the words themselves; they must
therefore be especially claimed in the pleadings, and evidence of them
must be given at the trial. Such damages depend upon the special
circumstances of the case, upon the plaintiff's position and upon the
conduct of third parties. In some cases special damages is a necessary
element in the cause of action. When on the face of them the words
used by the defendant clearly must have injured the plaintiff's reputa-
tion, they are said to be actionable in themselves; and the plaintiff
may recover a verdict for a substantial amount without giving any
evidence of actual pecuniary loss. But where the words are not on the
face of them such as the law will presume to be necessarily prejudicial
to a person's reputation, evidence must be given to show that as a
matter of fact some appreciable injury has followed from their use.
The injury to the plaintiff's reputation is the gist of the action; he
must show that his character has suffered through the defendant's
false assertions; and where there is no presumption in his favor, he
can only show this by giving evidence of some special damage."
Newell on Slander and Libel, 2nd ed. page 849.
-221 Ky. 765, 299 S. W. 967 (1927). See comments on the case,
13 Corn. L. Q. 469; 41 Har. L. Rev. 1070; 23 Ill. L. Rev. 295; 16 Ky.
L. J. 364; 26 Mich. L. Rev. 682; 12 Minn. L. Rev. 426; 1 So. Cal. L. Rev.
293; 6 Tenn. L. Rev. 291; 14 Va. L. Rev. 652; 37 Yale L. 3. 835.
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for damages. Here then, is a further illustration of the fact
that the substantive right of privacy gives relief in certain cases,
whore recovery for a libel is impossible.
It remains to discuss the basis for the protection of the right
of privacy in Kentucky. In the Foster-Milburn case the court
cited the Pavesich ease as sole authority. No further attempt to
justify the decision was made except to say that the publication
of such a testimonial was a fraud on both the -public and the
plaintiff. But in the Brents case the court in a lucid, logical
opinion, made a real attempt to rationalize the holding. The
court remarked that a new right, the right of privacy, had been
developed in the last few years, which while not yet capable of
concrete definition, was generally recognized as the right to be
let alone, to be free from unwarranted publicity in matters with
which the public is not necessarily concerned. The opinion then
states that the rule or principles upon which it is based are
stated in the original article in the Harvard Law Review. In
other words the court adopted the reasons for the protection of
the right suggested by Warren and Brandeis.' s
Missouri recognized the right of privacy in 1911 in Munden
v. Harris.'1  This is another "picture ad" case and would add
little to the discussion were it not for the fact that the opinion
illustrates the inability of some courts to distinguish between
the recognition of the substantive right and the problem of
devising remedies to protect the right. A court could well recog-
nize the right and give damages for its breach by way of rem
edy, but refuse because of lack of precedent, to give an injunc-
tion by way of remedy, since no property right was involved.
"See also the Kentucky case, Douglas v. Stokes, 149 Ky. 506, 149
S. W. 849 (1912), where a photographer, was held liable for using a
photograph of plaintiff's dead malformed child contrary to agreement.
Apparently there are two grounds for this dicision-the violation of a
contractual obligation and a violation of the right of privacy. The
court considered that if the publication of a photograph of the living
was actionable the same rule should apply to the publication of a
photograph of the dead. The case is especially interesting in that it
gives a right of action to the parents of the dead child-the right is
generally considered to be personal and to die with the individual.
But this court evidently considered that the parents as well as the
child had a right of privacy which had been violated. This indicates
that there are separate rights-one "to the individual and another to
the parents." On this phase of the case see, Ragland op. cit. supra,
note 14, at 103.
" 153 Mo. App. 652, 134 S. W. 1076 (1911).
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Overlooking this fact, courts are sometimes doubtful whether
there is a substantive right of privacy in a case where there is
no "property right" to be protected. To repeat, this is an error,
since the court can well recognize the substantive right of
privacy and give damages for its violation without searching for
some fictional or real property right upon which to base the
result. Law courts have long protected personal as well as prop-
erty rights. But when a court faces the further question,
whether equity will protect the right by way of injunction this
question must be met and answered, for it is the theory that
equity protects only property rights. To state it differently, the
question whether there is a property right to be protected will
be met only where an injunction is asked and should not be a
problem for the court where damages alone are asked.
That was the situation in the Munden case. The plaintiff
asked for damages alone. There were two counts, one for libel
and one for the disturbance of the right of privacy. The de-
fendant demurred to the right of privacy count on the ground
that there was no property right to be protected-that the law
does not afford redress for an invasion by one person of another's
privacy, unless it is accompanied by some injury to his property.
Although the plaintiff did not ask for an injunction the court
considered that this objection must be met and found a property
right in one's picture. This was unnecessary. The explanation
of the error in the Munden case is likely due to the fact that
the attorneys for the defendant argued that a property right
was necessary, if damages were to be given, and the court was
led off by the suggestion. This error on the part of the court
makes the case of little value in the general problem of determin-
ing the reasons given by the courts for the protection of the sub-
stantive right of privacy.
Kansas recognized the right of privacy in 1918 in the case
of Kunz v. Alien.20 In that case the defendant caused moving
pictures to be taken of the plaintiff without her permission while
she was making some purchases in his store. These were later
used to advertise his business in a local moving picture theatre.
She asked damages. The court held that they should be allowed,
and apparently based its decision on the authority of the Pave-
'102 Kan. 883 172 Pac. 532 (1918).
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sich and Mlunden cases, 21 not attempting to discuss the reasons
for giving protection as an original matter.
Georgia, which had protected the right of privacy in 1905,
affirmed its position by protecting the right again in 1925 in the
case of Byfield v. Candler.2 2 In that case the defendant entered
the plaintiff's stateroom and sought to debauch her. The court.
instructed: "I charge you that this action is for assault and bat-
tery upon the plaintiff and not for entering the plaintiff's
room." It was held that the court erred in giving this instruc-
tion, since a passenger upon a vessel is entitled to the privacy of
her room. This right the court considered to be separate from
his right to be free from assault. The importance of the decision
rests in the recognition of the right of privacy as an independent
right and not an interrelated one. The case not only recognizes
the right of privacy, it recognizes its violation as a separate and
distinct tort. No formal opinion was rendered in the case, and
the "syllabus by the court" does not attempt to give the rea-
sons of the court for the protection of the right. Had this been
done it is likely that the court would have relied upon the reasons
given in the earlier Georgia case in 1905. In that case, we have
found,2 3 the court considered that the right of privacy is a right
derived from the natural law.
After a consideration of the rationale of the decisions in the
five states which have recognized the right of privacy, one con-
cludes that little has been added to the reasons originally given
for the recognition of th right by Warren and Brandeis. The
Pavesich case suggests the natural law as the basis of the right.
The Louisiana cases do not attempt to give reasons for the re-
sults reached. The Foster-Mlilburn case in Kentucky cites the
Pavesich ease as sole authority. But the subsequent Kentucky
case of Brents v. Morgan, which seeks to make a real attempt to
rationalize the holding states that the principles upon which the
right of privacy rests are stated in the original article in the
Harvard Law Review. Apparently Kentucky has adopted the
reasons suggested by Warren and Brandeis. The Missouri case
appears to rest upon the irrelevant issue of protection of
2 Notes 5 and 19, respdctively.
" 160 Ga. 732, 125 S. E. 905 (1924). Commented on in 10 Minn.
Law Rev. 55.
'See note 6 supra.
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property rights. The Kansas case is apparently based upon the
authority of the Pavesich and Munden cases, and there is no
attempt to discuss the reasons for giving protection as an orig-
inal matter. With the exception of the doubtful basis of the
decision in the Pavesich case, little has been added to the reasons
suggested in the original article for the recognition of the right.
Since that is true, those reasons will now be examined.
The thesis of the original article 24 was that the individual
is entitled to an inviolate personality. This, the authors pointed
out, had been partly gained by the protection which the law had
given from physical battery in its various forms, and then suc-
cessively, in addition, from assault, from nuisance, and finally
from slander and libel. Starting with protection of the physical
only, the law had' progressed step b~y step. But sufficient
progress had not yet been made, it was contended. The actions
of slander and libel, based upon injury to reputation rather than
upon injury to the individual's feelings or his lowered estimate
of hmself, were not a sufficient protection in many cases.
For some of these additional aspects of a full personality,
the law had already attempted to vouchsafe its protection. This
had been done by giving protection to thoughts, sentiments and
emotions, expressed through the medium of writing or the arts.
For example, the law protected private letters, whether or not
they possessed literary value. But superficially, relief was
granted under the guise of protecting things material. In reality,
however, in many instances the objects of this protection were
non-material in nature. Indeed, such things as emotions, feel-
ings, in a word the intangible attributes of the higher man, were
the actual recipients of protection.
The difference was between form and substance. In form
the law had not departed from its established channel of pro-
tecting only material objects; in substance it had undergone an
extension commensurate in character with the desire of people
generally to "keep open the opportunity for more abundant
life," by emphasizing the intangible qualities of personality.
Although the courts continued to render "lip service" to pro-
tection of material things only, as a fact they were protecting
the imunaterial. In a word, the process was characteristically fic-
4 Har. L. Rev. 193.
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tional-the law was protecting new things under established
modes. It was suggested that the time to drop such fictions had
arrived and that the courts should protect personality as such.
What the courts had really been doing was protecting "the right
of privacy although refusing to do so in name. To recognize it
in name would not call for the formulation of a new principle.
Thus by analogy, it was shown that the right of privacy had
already been recognized, although not as such. It was suggested
that the time had now come to recognize it as such and to extend
it to the protection of the personal appearance, sayings, acts,
etc., of the individual, and to personal relations, domestic or
otherwise.
To summarize, it would appear that the protection of the
right of privacy is based largely upon the following reasons:
(1) The principle of the right of privacy has already been recog-
nized In the past through legal fictions. It should be expressly recog-
nized and extended where necessary to give the individual an inviolate
personality. This development of the law is necessary. An advancing
civilization brings heightening susceptibility to injuries other than
the strictly physical. Recent inventions and business practices give
Increased opportunity for, and instances of, the infliction of such in-juries. The common law, flexible to meet the needs of this advancing
civilization, must take another step and protect the individual in his
right "to be let alone."
(2) The Pavesich case" adds that the right of privacy is a right
derived from the natural law.
The decisions in the states which refuse to recognize the
right of privacy will now be examined and an attempt made
to determine the reasons of these courts for such refusal.
(2) Cases which reject the right, and reasons therefor.
Four states, Michigan, New York, Rhode Island and Wash-
ington have refused by decisions to accept' the right of pri-
vacy.2 6 Michigan led the way in 1899 in the -case of Atkinson
v. Doherty.27  This was a suit in equity by the widow of Col.
Atkinson, a well known lawyer and politician, to prevent the
defendant, a manufacturer of cigars, from putting the "John
Atkinson cigar" upon the market under a label bearing that
name and a likeness of Col. Atkinson. An injunction was re-
fused on the ground that there is no common law right of priv-
acy. The case could have been decided on the ground that the
"Note 5.
"See also, CorelWl -v. Wall, 22 T. L. R. 532 (1906).
"1121 Mich. 372, 80 N. W. 285 (1899).
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right of privacy is a personal right which dies with the individ-
ual, but the decision was not put upon this basis, and seems to
be authority for the rejection of the right in its entirety. The
decision is grounded upon the conclusion that an injury of this
type not amounting to a libel or slander is remediless. For in-
juries to feelings alone, the court considered there is as yet no
substantive relief, except in a few jurisdictions, where what is
known as the "Texas rule" prevails. This rule the court felt to
be a dangerous departure, not to be followed. So, in effect, the
rationale of the decision seems to be that the right of privacy
has not been recognized as a comnoA law substantive right, and,
in addition, that it should not be recoghized as one, since the
injury in such cases is essentially to the feelings, for which the
law rightly allows, according to the prevailing rule, no action.
The leading case on the rejection of the right of privacy is
the New York case, Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box 0o.28
The defendant published lithographed likenesses of the plain-
tiff without her consent upon posters advertising a certain brand
of flour. These were conspicuously displayed in stores, saloons,
and other public places. The posters were not alleged to be
libelous, for in fact the likeness of the plaintiff was a good one,
but she alleged that their display caused her great mental and
physical distress. She asked for damages and for an injunction.
Both were refused. This refusal was based upon two grounds:
1. Lack of precedent. The court considered that the "so-called
right of privacy" had not as yet found an abiding place in the law and
that it could not be incorporated rwithout doing violence to long-settled
principles.
2. The recognition of the right would bring about a vast amount
of litigation.
The decision in the Roberson case was unpopular and was
bitterly criticised in the press. As a direct result of the decis-
ion and its unpopularity, a statute on the subject was passed
in New York within a year after the case had been decided. It
may be found, Chapter 132 of the Laws of New York of 1903,
page 308. The statute recognizes and enforces the right of a
person to control the use of his name or portrait by others so far
as advertising or trade purposes are concerned.
Rhode Island rejected the right of privacy in 1909 in the
-171 N. Y. 538, 64 N. E. 442 (1902).
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case of Henry v. Cherry & Webb.29 The picture of the plaintiff
was published without his consent as a part of a mercantile
advertisement of automobile coats. The plaintiff was repre-
sented as apparently driving an automobile in which were seated
several other persons all wearing such coats.
Beneath the picture was the statement that all persons in
it were wearing auto coats of a certain quality and price. The
declaration was in trespass vi et arrnis, but there was a specific
allegation of a violation of the plaintiff's right of privacy, caus-
ing him great mental anguish. The defendant demurred. It
was considered that this demurrer raised two questions of law:
First. Has a person at common law a right designated as a "right
of privacy," for the invasion of which an action for damages lies?
Second. Is the unwarranted publication of a person's photograph
for advertising purposes actionable at common law, where the only
injury alleged is that of mental suffering?
Thus the right of privacy as a substantive common law
right was placed squarely before the court for acceptance, or
rejection. The court squarely rejected it.
It is difficult to determine with exactitude the reasons for
the decision. The court accepted the conclusion reached by the
majority of the court in Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box
Co.30 that the right had not as yet found an abiding place in the
law. In addition the court agreed with the case of Atkinson v,
Doherty3 ' that the action is essentially one for mental suffering
alone and that the law as yet offers no relief for such injury.
The basis of the decision in the Pavesich case3 2 that the right of
privacy is grounded upon natural law, was vigorously assailed
and rejected as unsound. Apparently then, the case does not
add anything by way of argument for the rejection of the right
which had not already been given in the Roberson and Atkinson
cases but it does contribute a penetrating analysis of the Pave-
sich case, rejecting the ground upon which it was decided.
In 1911 Washington rejected the right of privacy in the
case of Hillman v. Star Pub. Co.33 A newspaper published an
"30 R. I. 13 73 Atl. 97 (1909). See comments in 9 Col. L. Rev.
641; 8 Mich. L. Rev. 221.
N 171 N. Y. 538, 64 N. E. 442 (1902).
U121 Mich. 372, 80 N. W. 285 (1899).
p122 Ga. 190, 50 S. E. 68 (1905).
" 64 Wash. 691, 117 Pac. 594 (1911).
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article stating that the plaintiff's father was charged with the
commission of a crime. In connection with the article, a photo-
graph of the members of his family, including plaintiff, was pub-
lished. Plaintiff asked for damages upon two grounds, statutory
libel and a violation of her right of privacy. The defendant
demurred. The lower court sustained the demurrer. The appel-
late court affirmed the judgment. The court's conclusion on the
question of statutory libel has been strongly criticized.3 4 The
court refused to recognize the right of privacy as a substantive
right, "not so much because a primary right may not exist, but
because, in the absence of a statute, no fixed line between public
and private character can-be fixed." It is submitted that this
conclusion is unsound. There is no invasion of personal privacy
when the individual is a public character, it has been decided.
It is admitted that the line between what constitutes a public
and a private character is not a fixed and absolute one. But it
is not an insuperable difficulty to determine it on the facts of a
particular case in relation to a particular individual.
It is submitted, that the decision in its final analysis rests
upon the fact that the court failed to find what it considered to
be a sufficient precedent for a recognition of the right, although
it did recognize that an injury had been committed. The court
said:
"The defense in this case is purely technical, a call to precedent as
it has been established. A wrong is admitted, but it is said there Is
no remedy. We regret to say that this position is well taken . ..
We can only say that it is one of the ills that under the law cannot
be redressed."
The decisions in the four states which refuse to recognize
the right of privacy have been examined. Stripped of extrane-
ous discussion, such refusal seems to be based upon the follow-
ing reasons:
(1) The lack of precedent.(2) The injury in such cases is essentially to the feelings, for
which the law allows, according to the prevailing rule no recovery.(3) The recognition of the right would bring about a vast amount
of litigation.
These arguments will now be consideretd in turn.
(1) The lack of precedent.
10 Mich. L. Rev. 335.
THE RIGHT Op PRIvAcY TODAY
There are two approaches one may take in attempting to
meet the objection that there is lack of precedent for a recogni-
tion of the right of privacy. One approach offers an answer to
the objection by way of analogy. Analogous English cases had
repeatedly set forth the basic rights which underlie the right of
privacy. The original article by Warren and Brandeis pointed
out these cases and urged that the law had no new principle to
formulate when it extended its protection to cover the right of
privacy. -This position taken in the original article has been
thus summarized by Dean Pound :35
"A bit of juristic reasoning on the analogy of the legal rights that
secure other interests of personality, showing that there was an in-
terest in or claim to privacy as a part of personality and postulating
a legal order that secures personality completely, created. . . . a
new chapter in the law of torts."
The above approach meets the objection defensively. It as-
sumes that precedent of sonze kind ,nust be found. Lip service
is paid to precedent although it is apparent that in fact a new
step has been taken in the law.
The second approach meets the objection aggressively. It
may be boldly asserted that lack of precedent should not be a
fatal cause for refusal to grant relief at the present day for a
violation of privacy. This position, which was also suggested in
the original article, is grounded on the proposition that "the
beautiful capacity for growth which characterizes the common
law,30 should here manifest itself, and afford relief although
heretofore relief has not been given. It is admitted that the
right of privacy has no exact precedent in the common law, but
nevertheless, it is urged that "political, social, and economic
changes entail the recognition of new rights, and of new reme-
dies to secure these rights, which the common law in its eternal
youth expands to meet. Because of this growth, this continual
adoption of new principles to meet new experience, the law never
becomes entirely consistent and stable. Its roots reach back into
the past, and its new blooms are budding, whilst yet the old
wood is being sloughed off." 37
The first approach is not new, for the books are full of
"sPound, Interpretations of Legal History, 137.
"4 Har. L. Rev. 193, 195.
39 Amer. L. Rev. 37.
KENTUcxy LAw JOuRNAL
instances where analogies and fictions have been employed dur-
ing a transition period to mask changes in the law. It was well
for the authors of the original article to point out the analogous
cases in order that too abrupt and novel a change in the law
might not seem to be involved in a recognition of the suggested
right. The second approach is more abrupt. It is true that the
American rule of adherence to precedent is the safe rule and
that departures from it should be the exception. But if the
common law is to keep pace with a changing world exceptions
must occur at intervals.-.5
The second reason for refusing to recognize the right of
privacy will now be examined.
(2) The injury in such cases is essentially to the feelings,
for which the law allows, according to the prevailing rule, no
recovery.
The development of the law in giving relief for mental suf-
fering where there is no physical impact has been slow and cau-
tious. Where there is physical impact the law has long allowed
recovery for mental suffering in connection with the physical
injury. This has been true also in other situations where there
was a separate right of action which might serve as a peg upon
The following extract from the section on "Adherence To Prece-
dent, in Judge Cardozo's book, "The Nature of The Judicial, rrocess,'
is illustrative of the attitude to be taken by the courts:
"There should be greater readiness to abandon an untenable posi-
tion when the rule to be discarded may not reasonably be supposed to
have determined the conduct of the litigants, and particularly when in
its origin it was the product of institutions or conditions which have
gained a new significance or development with the progress of the
years. In such circumstances, the words of Wheeler, J., in Dwy v.
Connecticut Co., 89 Conn. 74, 99, express the tone and temper in which
problems should be met: 'That court best serves the law which recog-
nizes that the rules of law which grew up in a remote generation may,
in the fullness of experience, be found to serve another generation
badly, and which discards the old rule when it finds that another rule
of law represents what should be' according to the established and
settled judgment of society, and no considerable property rights have
become vested in reliance upon the old rule. It is thus great writers
upon the common law have discovered the source and method of its)
growth, and *n its growth found its health and life. It is not andi
should not be stationary. Changes of this character should not be.
left to the legislature' If judges have wofully misinterpreted the
mores of their day, or if the mores of their day are no longer those
of ours, they ought not to tie, in helpless submission, the hands -of
their successors." (Italics are, ours). Cardozo "The Nature of The
Judicial Process" at page 151.
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which to hang the element of mental suffering. Professor Good-
rich in the leading article on the subject, cites several instances
of these.3 9 Having a right of action upon which to base relief,
the courts are becoming more and more prone to allow mental
suffering as a parasitic factor to be also considered as an ele-
ment in determining damages. But all of these cases adhere
to the rule of thumb requiring mental disturbance to be coupled
with something else before redress is given. It is submitted that
the time has come to allow recovery for mental disturbance
where it is the sole element of damage. The trend has been
gradually in that direction for some years; it only remains to
mark out and limit the right.
One indication of the progress which has been made in this
direction is shown in the cases where the mental shock com-
plained of was inflicted intentionally. The better judicial view
allows recovery where the wrong complained of is a wilful one
intended to wound the feelings or from which such result should
reasonably be anticipated.40 But where the act is negligent
rather than intentional, recovery is denied.4 1 It would appear
that most of the cases arising under the right of privacy will be
cases where the mental suffering is caused by the defendant's
negligence rather than by his wilful desire to inflict injury.
Thus it is fairly difficult at the present stage of the development
of the law to work out a recovery of substantial damages if it is
admitted that the injury in right of privacy cases is essentially
to the feelings, but the difficulty can be overcome. There are
several channels of reasoning which will lead to that conclusion.
The following modes of approach to the problem are submitted:
(1) The law has long allowed recovery for injury
due to negligence where there is physical impact. But in the
case where there was mental suffering without physical impact,
it was considered that there was no legal injury. As a matter
of fact, it is now understood that mental suffering has a definite
physical side. The physical results to a degree are the same a-
where a physical impact has actually occurred. In other words
3 Goodrich, "Emotional Disturbances as LegaZ Damage," 20 Alich.
L. Rev. 497, 510.
49 See cases cited in annotation 23 A. L. R. 361; see discussion,
Pound, 28 Har. L. Rev. 343, 361.23 A. L. R. 361, 365.
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a physical disturbance is a concomitant of every mental dis-
turbance. There is an illuminating discussion of the effect of
mental suffering upon the physical organism by Dean Goodrich
in the article in the Michigan Law Review to which attention
has previously been called.4 2 Therein he convincingly points
out that mental disturbance as a purely mental thing does not
exist. If this be recognized, it does not entail the acceptance of
a new principle, to allow recovery for mental suffering. It
would simply stamp as inaccurate, judicial language formulated
at a time when no one knew as much as we now do about the
human organism.
(2) The second method of approaching the problem is
more abrupt than the one which has just been suggested. In
giving relief for mental suffering when coupled with some other
claim the law has already recognized the possession of a peaceful
mental state as a subject for protection. The law should now
take the next step, eliminate the parasitic element in recovery
for mental disturbance, and give relief for mental suffering as
such. This would be to disregard precedent to an extent and
would serve as another instance of the growth of the common
law in its effort to meet new conditions.
These approaches are not in conflict. To a certain extent
they embrace the same elements. They are given as instances
of suggested channels of thought to be followed in working out
a recovery.
As a matter of fact, the hesitancy of the courts to award
damages for mental disturbance as such has not been due to
any great difficulty in finding a need for the protection of a
peaceful mental state or of finding a channel of thought which
would lead from the legal conbeption of injury consisting only
of material, tangible harm to a conception which would include
injury to the feelings and emotions. An injury to them
is often more painful and more serious in its permanent results.
Apart from historical precedent, the reasons for the protection
of the one are as strong as those for the protection of the other
in many cases. The problem has not been whether relief should
be given for mental suffering. It has been the practical dif-
ficulty of the seeming lack of ability to estimate such injury, to
42n. 39 supra.
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measure it so that an assessment of money damages would not
be too purely guesswork.
There can be no doubt that this practical difficulty is present
and must be faced. But it is not overwhelming. To meet this
problem the court has the aid of trained physicians and mental
experts in estimating the extent of the damage in a given case.
They will also be invaluable in checkmating the imposter. The
practical problems to be met in measuring the amount of injury,
in preventing fraud and in limiting the extent of protection to
be given so that the interests of the individual and those of
society will be properly balanced, are not easy of solution; but
it is submitted that they are not more difficult than those which
the law meets in other instances, and that the need justifies the
effort to solve them.43
The third reason given by the courts for refusing to rec-
ognize the right of privacy remains to be considered.
(3) The recognition of the right would bring a vast
amount of litigation.
It would appear that this objection can be briefly dismissed
with the question, What of it? It is the business of the courts
to handle legitimate litigation. This objection in more or less
degree can be raised in bar of every development in the law. If
in our social progress, the time has come for the recognition of
the right of privacy, the courts are in operation for the purpose
of taking care of any litigation that may arise.
Nor need it be feared that a recognition of the right will
open the floodgates to redress all petty annoyances. The courts
will show the same good sense *in limiting the right that they
have shown in other instances. The judges who preside over
our appellate courts are members of a conservative profession.
There need be little apprehension that they will extend relief
beyond the bounds of justice and expediency.4 4
The three objections to a recognition of the right of privacy
given by the four states which refuse to accept the right have
a In addition to the authorities cited supra, see Bohlen, "Studies In
The Law of Torts," chapter V, entitled "Right to Recover for Injury
Resulting From Nfegligence Without Impact."
" On the objection that a recognition of the right of privacy would
open the floodgates of litigation see 17 Ky. L. J. 85, 94; 3 Mich. L. Rev.
559, 562. See also the discussion, 20 Mich. L. Rev. 497, 512.
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been considered, and an attempt has been made to answer them.
It is submitted that the objections are not insurmountable.
To summarize, it would seem from this study of the ad-
judications on the right of privacy, that the substantive right
has been accepted by decision in five jurisdictions. The
suggestion of the Georgia court in the Pavesich case,4 5 that
the right is based upon natural law, not being acceptable, the
reasons given in the original article for its recognition remain
the ones upon which the right is best grounded in the juris-
dictions accepting it. The right of privacy as a substantive
right has been rejected by decision in four jurisdictions on
account of reasons which, it is submitted, have been found to be
not insurmountable. While the right has been rather slow in
gaining recognition, it has attained a new stimulus in recent
years. In several instances it has been applied to situations
other than the original stereotyped set of facts where the de-
fendant was using the plaintiff's name or picture for commercial
purposes without his consent. It fills a distinct need in the law,
giving relief in -certain cases where without a recognition of the
right there would appear to be no remedy. Although the cases
accepting the right are not large in number, they do indicate
that it has vitality and should open the way to its further
recognition.4
B. Recognition of the substantive right in equity.
Is it necessary for the right of privacy to be recognized as
a substantive right which a law court will protect before equity
can give relief 1 Some courts have apparently so considered. 47
It is submitted that equity can give relief regardless of the de-
fendant's liability at law, recognizing a substantive right in
equity where there is no substantive right, necessarily, at law.
In discussing this problem, Professor Chafee cites as an
illustration, the following right of privacy hypothetical case:
"A young woman has been receiving marked attention from a man
whom she dislikes. When she refuses to see him, he sends her letters,
although she requests him to desist. The letters are annoying, insult-
ing and defamatory. The police decline to act. She has no remedy at
law for the man's conduct does not constitute libel in the absence of
"Note 5 supra.
See "The Right To Privacy Today," 43 Har. L. Rev. 297, 302(1930).
4 For citations see Chafee, "Does Equity FoTow The Law of
Torts?" 75 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, note 20 on page 7.
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publication, and her mental anguish does not in this jurisdiction, at
least, entitle her to sue for damages. Unless she can obtain an injunc-
tion, she must endure an indefinite continuance of the correspondence.
May equitable relief be granted?""
This situation raises the question, Does equity necessarily
follow the law of torts? Suppose no tort to the plaintiff has
been committed. Mlay equity nevertheless grant an injunction?
Equity assumes the existence of the legal system and rights
created by it. When equity came into existence the law court
was a going concern. In theory and largely in practice, it was
not the purpose of equity to operate in conflict with the existing
system and its established principles, but to supplement it by
giving relief in meritorious situations where' there was not an
adequate relief at law. Such a theory does not prevent equity
from recognizing new rights not recognized as substantive rights
at law.
There are instances where equity has done this. Professor
Chafee concludes "that in many kinds of torts the court of
equity defines the liability for itself without any prior deter-
mination thereof at law, and in at least four classes of cases
where the law courts have denied relief, injunctions have issued
to protect a legal right, viz., (1) several situations in waste;
(2) causing breach of contract without fraud or coercion, which
is not actionable at law in some states; (3) removal of cloud on
title where an action for slander of title will not lie; (4) wrong-
ful expulsion from unincorporated associations. "49
It is not the purpose of this article to discuss the question
in detail. That has been ably accomplished by Professor Chafee
in the University of Pennsylvania Law Review article already
referred to. His conclusion that equity recognizes rights in
situations where courts of law do not recognize the existence of
substantive rights is abundantly supported by the cases.
II. Will equity lend its aid in protecting the right of
privacy by injunction?
The first part of this study has dealt with the substantive
right. It has been found that in a few states there is such a
"Chafee, op. cit. supra note 47, at page 6. This hypothetical case
seems to be founded largely on the facts of Williams v. O'Shaughnessy,
172 N. Y. Supp. 574 (1918), discussed infra. See infra, at note 73.
4Chafee, op. cit. supra note 47 at page 27.
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thing as a substantive right of privacy. The remedial side of the
question remains to be considered.
There are two remedies for a violation of the right of pri-
vacy. An action of tort for damages lies al law for a violation
of the right without a showing of special damages. The second
remedy is a preventive one by the use of the injunction in
equity.
Once the right is recognized at law in a particular juris-
diction, the tort remedy presents no further problems. But
when equity is asked to lend its aid in protecting the right by
the use of the injunction, additional difficulties are encoun-
tered. A jurisdiction may well recognize the substantive right
and be willing to award damages for its violation but refuse in
a court of equity to give the preventive relief of the injunction.
Courts have not always recognized this distinction. For
example, in Munden v. Harris5 ° discussed supra, although the
action was for damages alone the defendant demurred to the
right of privacy count on the ground that there was no property
right to be protected and the court erroneously considered that
this objection had to be met when in fact such a question could
only arise when an injunction was asked for. Such failure to
recognize the distinction by courts is sometimes due to a failure
to properly analyze the problem, sometimes to a desire upon the
part of the court not to have to face squarely the question
whether there is a substantive right of privacy in the particular
jurisdiction.
If the action is in a law court in tort for damages, the
problem before the court is to determine whether that juris-
diction recognizes a substantive right of privacy. If it does and
a violation has occurred damages will be awarded.
The problem is much more difficult when the suit is in
equity and an injunction is asked. There, as in the law court,
the first question to be considered by the court is whether a sub-
stantive right of privacy is recognized in that jurisdiction. If
the court answers that question in the affirmative, it is necessary
to consider second, whether equity will lend its aid in protecting
this right.
It is in a consideration of this second question that the three
problems now to be considered arise.
5 Note 19 supra.
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1. Is the remedy at law adequate?
The true test of equity jurisdiction is the existence of a legal
right for which there is not a full, adequate, and complete
remedy at law. Chappelt v. Stewart 51 illustrates the inadequacy
of the remedy at law in most right of privacy cases.
In that case the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had
employed detectives to follow him and that this caused him great
annoyance, interfered with his social standing, and injured his
business and financial credit. The court sustained a demurrer
to a bill for an injunction. Apparently the allegations as to
business and financial standing were not sustained by the facts,
for the court considered the case as one not involving property
rights but merely an invasion of personal rights. The decision
is based partly on the rule that equity protects only property
rights and partly on the opinion of the court that the remedy
at law is fully adequate to redress all injuries of this kind.
But damages is clearly inadequate to compensate for an
injury of this character. Mloney is often small compensation
for injuries to the feelings. As suggested by Dean Pound, the
plaintiff may be, for example, a clergyman, a man of refined
and sensitive feelings. "To suggest that damages under such
circumstances would be an adequate remedy is to use the term
'adequate' in a Pickwiekian sense or to attribute to the law
unnecessary obliquity of vision.' '52 In certain types of personal
injuries, such for example, as threatened assault and battery,
the remedy at law may be adequate. In many right of privacy
eases it will be very inadequate.
2. Is it necessary that a property right be involved?
Mrost of the eases which have definitely by decision passed
upon the right of privacy were actions for damages.5 3 We have
"182 Md. 323, 33 Atl. 542 (1896).
uPound, Equitable Relief Against Defamation And Injuries To
Personality, 29 Har. L. Rev. 640, 669.
1 In the following cases the right to damages was recognized:
Pavesich, v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S. E. 68 (1905);
Foster-Milburn Co. v. Chinn., 134 Ky. 424, 120 S. W. 364 (1909); Brents
v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S. W. 967 (1927); Douglas v. Stokes, 149 Ky.
506, 149 S. W. 849 (1912.); Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652, 134
S. W. 1076 (1911); Kunz v. Allen, 102 Kan. 883, 172 Pac. 532 (1918);
Byfleld v. Candler, 160 Ga. 732, 125 S. E. 905 (1924).
In the following cases a recognition of the substantive right was
refused: Henry v. Cherry & Webb, 30 R. I. 13, 73 Atl. 97 (1909); Hill-
man v. Star Pub. Co., 64 Wash. 691, 117 Pac. 594 (1911); Roberson v.
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learned that damage cases should involve only a consideration
of whether a substantive right is recognized in the jurisdiction
and do not raise the question, Is there a property right in-
volved? Such a question is not before the court unless an
injunction is asked.
In only four cases in these nine states were injunctions
asked. Those cases were Itskovitchb v. Whitaker,54 Schulman v.
Whdtaker,55 Atkinson v. Doherty,56 and Roberson v. Rochester
Folding Box Oo.,57 in which last case both damages and an in-
junction were asked. These cases furnish no aid upon the problem
whether a property right is necessary. The two Louisiana de-
cisions assume the substantive right of privacy and the remedy
by injunction without a discussion of the problem involved. In
the other two cases, injunctions were refused upon the ground
that there is no substantive right, eliminating any need of dis-
cussing the power of a court of equity to protect purely personal
rights.
Since the decisions which have passed upon the right of
privacy, as such, do not furnish aid upon the problem, it is
necessary to look elsewhere.
Is the jurisdiction of equity confined to securing rights of
property? In the past this has not even been considered a
moot question, for since Gee v. Pritchard8 courts of equity have
considered that their jurisdiction was limited to the protection
of rights of property, and that rights of personality were with-
out the pale of relief. Although there is no substantial reason
today for such limitation,59 and although able writers have
argued to the contrary, courts have been slow to reject the doc-
trine, generally insisting upon some element of a property
interest, however trivial. This may have been due to a mere
prejudice based upon "the dicta of a great judge in the pioneer
case" or upon a haphazard development of the cases, but at
any rate the rule became firmly entrenched in the law of equity
and although modern judges have strained at the leash of prece-
Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N. Y. 538, 64 N. E. 442 (1902), a case
where both damages and an injunction were asked for and both refused.
" 115 La. 479, 39 So. 499 (1905).
51115 La. 623, 39 So. 737 (1905).
50121 Mich. 372, 80 N. W. 285 (1899).
- 171 N. Y. 538, 64 N. E. 442 (1902).
2 Swanst. 402 1318).
Clark, Principles of Equity, 314.
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dent to get away from it, it still remains to be overcome. The
courts in seeking to evade the rule have stretched the term
"property" to a point where it has a meaning much broader
than any which would make it of value as a standard. Often
the property right protected has been so nominal as to be
actually illusory. Such an attitude shows that the rule will be
discarded and there is undoubtedly a marked tendency in this
direction; but there is as yet very little actual authority for
giving injunctive relief where the sole damage consists of injury
to personality.
All discussion on the problem runs back to the leading case
of Gee v. Pritchard.60 The defendant in that case was the
illegitimate son of Mr. Gee. He had been reared by Mr. Gee
and his wife, the plaintiff, in their home. During the lifetime
of A . Gee relations, among the three were apparently not only
friendly but affectionate. But as might be expected under the
circumstances, the affection of the plaintiff was not very deeply
rooted, and after the death of Mr. Gee her motherly interest in
the defendant waned. This, coupled with a dissatisfaction upon
the part of the defendant in the provision made for him in Mr.
Gee's will, caused them to cease to be on friendly terms. De-
fendant threatened to publish letters which the plaintiff had
written to him while a member of the family. The cause came
on before Lord Eldon on a motion to dissolve an interlocutory
injunction.
In a colloquy with counsel it was stated by counsel for the
plaintiff that an attempt wpuld be made to sustain the injunc-
tion on the ground that the publication would be painful to the
feelings of the plaintiff, but Lord Eldon replied that he would
relieve counsel from that argument since the injunction could
"not be maintained on any principle of this sort" and that
relief could only be rested upon a protection of rights of
property. Since there had been no claim that the letters pos-
sessed any literary value there was no property right of value
before the court. Lord Eldon was iiot satisfied that there was,
but since Lord Hardwicke and Lord Apsley in previous de-
cisions0 1 had decided that there was a sufficient property right
"2 Swanst. 402 (1818) 36 Eng. Rep. 670. For a splendid analysis
of this case see Pound, 29 Har. L. Rev. 640, 642, and Long, 33 Yale
L. J. 115, 122.
"Pope v. Uurl, 2 Atk. 342, 26 Eng. Rep. 608 (1741) letters from
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in private letters to entitle them to protection, Lord Eldon, feel-
ing bound by these prior decisions, granted the injunction.
Thus the case presents a situation where the court expressly
denies by dictum its power to protect purely personal rights as
such, but does protect them indirectly grounding the injunction
upon a fictional property right dug up out of precedent.
In reading the case as a whole, it is difficult to decide
whether Lord Eldon's action was bold 62 in that he consciously
secured the right of privacy indirectly where he could not secure
it directly, or whether he was not an unwilling protector of the
right, forced by precedent into an acceptance of the strained
theory of property rights in private letters. Likely the proper
conclusion is that equity at the time had no jurisdiction to
secure interests of personality but it had recognized the theory
of property rights in private letters. Lord Eldon simply en-
ffrced the law as he considered it was, and should neither be
censured nor lauded for the indirect result of the decision.
Whatever his attitude, the writer considers that his emphasis
upon protection of property, so often repeated by subsequent
chancellors, has done much to retard the protection of personal
rights as such. In particular, subsequent courts have continued
to apply the rule of the case as to private letters so that now,
more than a hundred years after Gee v. Pritchard, it is the pre-
vailing rule that the publication of private letters can be en-
joined on the fanciful theory of protection of property rights.63
Such a result is good but the reasoning which leads to it is fie-
tional in the extreme.
Whatever the personal attitude of Lord Eldon towards the
protection of personal rights, his dictum in the pioneer case has
much influenced subsequent judges. Only in recent years has
it been seriously questioned. The recognition of the right of
privacy in some jurisdictions has caused some of this questioning
Swift, Pope and others; Thompson v. Stanhope, Amb. 737, 27 Eng. Rep.
476 (1774), the celebrated letters from Lord Chesterfield to his son.
In neither case was the court influenced by the fact that the letters
were written by distinguished literary persons, or at least the reports
of the cases do not so indicate.
13 Pound op. cit. supra note 52, at 643.
3Pomerov's Eq. Jutr. (2d ed.), 'sees. 1353 and' 1997; Folsom V.
Marsh, Fed. Cas. No. 4901 (1841); Woosley v. Judd, 4 Duer-379 (1855);
Grigsby v. Breckinridge, 2 Bush (Ky.) 480 (1867); Baker v. Libbie, 97
N. E. 109, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 551, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 944. Baker v,. Libbie
is the leading American case.
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as has the general recognition of the value of personal rights in
an advancing society. Some recent judges and text-writers
have done more than question; they have rejected it.
Perhaps no greater extension has been made in the rule
than is to be found in cases involving family relations. This
problem has been discussed by- the writer in a prior' article. 4
There is strong language for the protection of personal rights
in the celebrated dictum in the leading case of Vanderbilt v.
Mitch ell,0 5 where the court said:
"If it appeared in this case that only the complainant's status and
personal rights were thus threatened or thus invaded by the action of
the defendants and by the filing of the false certificate, we should hold,
and without hesitation, that an individual has rights, other than
property rights, which he can enforce in a court of equity and which a
court of equity will enforce against invasion. And we should declare
that the complainant was entitled to relief. . . . In many cases
courts have striven to uphold the equitable jurisdiction upon the ground
of some property right, however slender and shadowy, and the tendency
of the courts is to afford more adequate protection to personal rights,
and to that end to lay hold of slight circumstances tending to show
a technical property right."
However, in the end the court insisted that the technical
basis of the decision was the protection of property rights, and
expressly said that whether the bill might not have been rested
on the protection of personal rights was not decided, since the
case presented the property feature sufficiently to rest the de-
cision wholly on that. The remarks on the protection of personal
rights, as such, are pure dictum, but they are illustrative not
only of a method of growth and change in the law, but of the
tendency of modern courts to discard the rule.
In Ex parle Warfleld, 6 the right to services and consortium
was sufficient to ground an injunction upon, as upon the pro-
tection of a property right, but apparently the court was willing
to, and did in this case, protect personal rights, as such. This
conclusion is based upon the language of the opinion in various
places as for example, the following:
"The growth of the principles of equity in this regard have been
greatly enlarged, so that it may be said that where a court of equity
"Moreland, Injunctive ControZ of Family Relations, 18 Ky. L. J. 1.
1162 N. J. Eq. 910, 67 Atl. 97, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 304 (1907); 21
Har. L. Rev. 54.
40 Tex. Criin. App. 413, 50 S. W. 933 (1899). See also Wvitte v.
Bauderer (Tex. Civ. App.) 255 S. W. 1016 (1923).
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has jurisdiction of the case, and a party shows that he is liable to suffer
injury by some act threatened or that may be done pending the liti-
gation, whether this has regard to property in issue or to some personal
right dependent upon some personal act or conduct, the court will grant
the writ. In such case, it cannot be said the court lacks the power,
although in doubtful cases it may refrain from the exercise of such
power." 6
The statute, which the court construed as giving wide
power to equity courts in granting injunctions, weakens this
decision, but the language of the opinion indicates that ihe
court considered it would have reached a like result in the
absence of statute, the court saying, "This would be so under
the liberal rules of equity, as now practiced in the courts," but
more so under the provisions of the Texas statute. So we con-
clude that although the court had both the protection of
property rights and the provisions of a broad statute as a basis
for the injunction, it was willing to protect the personal rights
involved, as such.
In the leading case of Stark v. Hamilton,68 the court instead
of basing its jurisdiction upon the power of equity to secure
and protect the rights of infants, preferred to consider its
power to protect property rights and rights of personality.
Apparently, this is another case where the court was willing
to protect personality, as such. In fact a learned writer con-
siders that this is "a square decision that equity will protect
rights of personality.' '69 But the ease involved, as the court
suggested, both personal and property rights. Having gained
jurisdiction to protect property rights, the court could give
complete relief which might include a protection of personality.
But the court disapproved of giving protection to personality in
this indirect manner, saying :70
"It is difficult to understand why injunctive protection of a mere
property right should be placed above similar protection from the con-
tinual humiliation of the father and the reputation of the family. In
some instances the former may be adequately compensated in damages,
but the latter is irreparable; for no mere money consideration could
restore the good name and reputation of the family or palliate the
'humiliation of the father for the continual debauching of his daughter."
Apparently the injunction here is for the protection of the
a Ibid. 937. Cf. also comment on case, The Progress of the Law,
Chafee, 34 Har. L. Rev. 388, 413.
U149 Ga. 227, 99 S. E. 861 (1919); affirming 149 Ga. 44, 99 S. E. 40
(1919).
Chafee, op. cit. supra, note 67 at 412.
71 Op. cit. supra note 68 at 862.
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personal rights involved, which seemed to predominate in the
mind of the court. Like Ex parte Warfield,71 the case is weak-
ened by state code provisions which give extended jurisdiction
to equity, if interpreted by a liberal court.7 2
The court indicated a willingness to protect purely personal
rights in Williams v. O'Shaughnessy.7 3 In that case the plaintiff
asked for a temporary injunction restraining the defendant
from sending letters to her through the mails. The court said
that it did not think an injunction would lie to restrain mere
letters written as such, but if written for the purpose of an-
noyance and they had that effect, the restraining order might
be granted. It did not appear that any of the letters had been
written after the plaintiff had objected. The court concluded
that if the defendant persisted after being requested to stop,
the plaintiff could renew her application for a temporary
injunction.
It is clear that in this case no property right, but only the
personal right not to be annoyed was involved. In addition to
the apparent willingness of the court to protect personality as
such under the proper circumstances, the case presents several
other interesting angles. In the absence of publication to third
persons is there any tort here? This may be an instance where
equity indicates a willingness to recognize a legal right where
none exists at law.74
Protection of personal rights, though wthout a discussion
of the question, was afforded in Kirk v. Wyman.7 5 The plaintiff,
an elderly lady, was afflicted with a mild form of leprosy con-
tracted while serving as a. foreign missionary. The health
authorities were about to take her to the city pest house, which
was unfit for her habitation. She asked for an injunction to
restrain them from so doing. Clearly no property rights were
involved, for she was not engaged in any business or occupation
7 Supra note 66.
" The above discussions of the cases Vanderbilt v. Mitchell, EX
Varte Warfleld, and Stark v. Hamilton, as might be expected, follow
closely the writer's article in 18 Ky. L. 3. 1 cited supra at note 64. The
facts of these cases though, will be found to be more fully discussed
in that article.
72172 N. Y. Supp. 574 (1918); commented upon 19 Col. L. Rev. 163.
' See article, Chafee 75 Univ. of Pa. L. Rev. 1, discussed supra,
note 47.
U 83 S. c. 372, 65 S. E. 387, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1188 (1909); com-
mented upon 33 Yale L. J. at 130.
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with which such removal would interfere. The court consid-
ered that under all the circumstances, isolation in her home was
sufficient protection to the health of the city, and gave an in-
junction. The injunction was granted on the ground that such
removal would be an invasion of her personal liberty not essen-
tial to the public health, for which there was no adequate remedy
at law.
Modern legal publicists more and more evince an attitude
in favor of the protection of personal rights by injunction.
Articles by Dean Pound, and Professors Chafee, Long and Rag-
land discussing the problem and advocating such protection,
have been cited frequently in this paper. Modern text-writers
take the same position. Clark, in his "Principles of Equity"
indicates the trend of thought when he says:
"Where the sole damage suffered consists of an injury to person-
ality, i. e., the feelings of the plaintiff-there is very little authority
for giving injunctive relief, though the reasons for not giving it are
hardly plausible." 11
Lawrence on Equity Jurisprudence presents a similar
attitude:
"Various dicta are to be found to the effect that equity protects
property rights only, unless authorized by a statute, a theory which is
hardly tenable unless the term 'property' be given a meaning much
broader than any which would make it of value as a standard, and one
which has been definitely repudiated in several cases." 1
The recent book by Professor Walsh gives an entire chapter
to equitable protection of personal rights. The author has con-
tributed a brilliant analysis of the problems and the cases in-
volved. He concludes that:
"It is clear that equity protects many rights of a personal char-
acter whenever they are rights of substance, often classifying them as
property rights in order to bring them within the earlier cases holding
that equity will protect property rights only. . . . It is logical to
expect that the courts will extend relief in equity to these cases where
damages would be inadequate, as exactly the same reasons exist there-
for as in the cases referred to in which equity has given relief. If this
position be taken, the true nature of the supposed rule that equity will
not protect purely personal rights is disclosed as a mere prejudice based
on a haphazard development of the cases rather than on any controlling
principle." "
"I Clark, Principles of Equity, sec. 239.
"Lawrence on Equity Jurisprudence (1929), see. 53.
' Walsh on Equity (1930), secs. 50 and 52.
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No more searching excoriation of the historic rule is to be
found in the books than in a note to Chappell v. Stewart which
has frequently been quoted:
"The above decision is based expressly on the existence of an
adequate remedy, but there is an intimation that the rights affecting
the complainant's pers-on are beyond the scope of the powers of a court
of equity. In this intimation the court is fully justified by repeated
declarations of the courts and the writers on equity jurisprudence.
Yet a declaration of this sort taken literally and in its fltl meaning
would make the system of equity suitable only to a semi-savage society
which has muck respect for property but little for human life. OuO
equity jurisprudence does not quite deserve so severe a reproach. 14
does indeed, do much for the protection of personal rights, although
It has not been willing to acknowledge the fact but has persisted in
declaring the contrary." ' (Italics are ours.)
It would appear that the doctrine that equity has no juris-
diction to protect personal rights is unsound in principle. The
fundamental basis of equity jurisdiction is inadequacy of rem-
edy at law. In many cases involving the protection of personal
rights the remedy at law is just as inadequiate as it is in cases
involving the protection of property rights. Unless there is
some rational basis for a different rule the same one should be
applied in both situations. About the only basis for the dif-
ference at the present time is ill-considered precedent that
equity protects only property rights. Such an unreasonable,
arbitrary and unjust rule which results in equity protecting
one in his property but refusing to protect him in his far more
sacred and vital personal rights, is unsupportable and should
be discarded. Equity has gone about as far as it can in its effort
to evade the rule by the use of fictional and strained applica-
tions of the term "property." There remains but to cast off
these familiar transitional methods of growth in the laws0 and to
recognize the power of equity to protect personal rights as such.
7,37 L. R. A. 783.
9* "But now I employ the expression 'Legal Fiction' to signify any
assumption which conceals, or affects to conceal, the fact that a rule
of law has undergone alteration, its letter remaining unchanged, its
operation being modified. The words, therefore, inclide the instances
of fictions which I have cited from the English and Roman law, but
they embrace much more, for I should speak of the English Case law
and of the Roman Responsa Prudentutm as resting on fiction. Both
these examples will be examined presently. The fact is in both cases
that the law has been wholly changed; the fiction is that it remains
what It always was. It is not difficult to understand why fictions are
particularly congenial to the infancy of society. They satisfy the desire
for improvement, which is not quite wanting, at the same time that
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There has already accumulated a sufficient body of case and
text authority to justify such a step. s8
3. Is it expedient to grant equitable relief I
It is doubtful whether it is expedient to attempt to enforce
certain personal rights by injunction. For example, it is prob-
lematical whether the beneficial results obtained justify the use
of the injunction in cases where a third party has interfered
with the marital relationship. Should equity attempt to force
two people to continue such an intimate relationship when one
of them emphatically desires to discontinue it? Perhaps, after
all pros and cons ar6 considered, it is better to adopt a policy of
hands off in equity, and leave the parties either to a reconcili-
ation or the remedial relief of a divorce. Perhaps after all, if
damages are not a sufficient palliative, a divorce is the best solu-
tion for an eclipsed marital relationship. This may be the best
solution from the standpoint of society, the parties, and even
the children, if any.
But there are other instances in cases involving personal
rights where the use of the injunction is not only expedient but
the only adequate relief. This is particularly true in many
right of privacy cases.
For example, a young woman is a student in a modern
state university. She is a leader in various campus activities
and occupies an enviable position in the university life. A local
manufacturer of flour has obtained her photograph in a manner
they do not offend the superstitious disrelish for changes which is
always prsent. At a particular stage of social progress they are invalu-
able expedients for overcoming the rigidity of law. . .. To revile
them as merely fraudulent is to betray ignorance of their peculiar
office in the historical development of law." Maine on Ancient Law at
pages 26, 27.
"Itzkovitz v. Whitaker, 115 La. 479, 39 So. 499, 117 La. 708, 42 So.
228 (1906); Schulman v. Whitaker, 115 La. 628, 39 So. 737, 117 La. 704,
42 So. 227 (1906). These two Louisiana decisions squarely recognize
the right of privacy and its protection by injunction. Vanderbilt v.
Mitchell, 72 N. J. Eq. 910, 67 AtI. 97 (1907) dictum; Ex Parte Warfelc,
40 Tex. Crim. App. 413, 50 S. W. 933 (1899), personal rights protected
as such, but decision weakened by state code provisions which gave
extended jurisdiction to equity; Stark v. Hamilton, 149 Ga. 227, 99 S. E.
861 (1919), personal rights protected as such, but this case likewise is
weakened by state code provisions giving extended jurisdiction to
equity; Williams v. O'Shaughnessy, 172 N. Y. Supp. 574 (1918) dictum;
Kirk v. Wyman, 83 S. C. 372, 65 S. E. 387 (1909); Clark, Principles of
Equity, sec. 239; Lawrence on Equity Jurisprudence, sec. 53; Walsh on
Equity, secs. 50, 52; 37 L. R. A. 789.
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not involving a breach of trust, and intends to use her picture
upon every sack of a new brand of flour he is introducing to the
public under the attractive name of "Sweet Maid Flour." This
would cause her great mental suffering and lead to her social
ruin upon the campus. Damages would not be an adequate
remedy for such an injury.
Is it expedient to grant an injunction? It appears that the
beneficial results obtained justify the use of the, injunction in
such cases. It may be questioned whether the court can effec-
tively control marital relations by the use of the injunction. But
the difficulties encountered there do not arise in most of the
other cases where there is an attempt to enforce personal rights
by injunction. It does not appear to be inexpedient to enjoin
the use of a name or picture in connection with advertising or
trade purposes. It is not only feasible but necessary to curb the
dangers ever present in modern scurrilous journalism. Other
situations occur to the thoughtful where the injunction would
be of great practical aid in the protection of the right of privacy.
Nor does it appear that unusual difficulties would be encoun-
tered in enforcing such injunctions. Contempt proceedings are
the proper method of enforcing injunctive process and can be-
used here as effectively as elsewhere. This phase of the problem
is not peculiar to this situation.
CONCLUSION
Five states have recognized the right of privacy as a sub-
stantive right. It appears that such recognition is based largely
upon the reasons originally suggested by Warren and Brandeis,
with the exception that the Pavesich case considers that the
right is derived from the natural law. Four states have refused
by decision to accept the right of privacy as a substantive right.
Such refusal seems to be based upon lack of precedent, the fact
that the injury in such cses is essentially to the feelings for
which the law allows, according to th'e prevai]irg rule, no-
recovery, and the apprehension of certain jidges that the rec-
ognition of the right would bring about a vast amount of litiga-
tion. It would appear that these objections are not insur-
mountable.
It should not be necessary for the right of privacy to be
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recognized as a right which a law court will protect before
equity can give relief. It is submitted that equity can give
relief regardless of the defendant's liability at law, recognizing
a substantive right in equity where there is no substantive right,
necessarily, at law.
A court of equity having decided that a substantive right
of privacy has been recognized or should be recognized in that
jurisdiction, encounters additional problems in considering
whether an injuncton will be granted. The injunction is not
only an expedient remedy, but the only adequate one in many
cases. The historical doctrine that equity protects only property
rights, is unsound in principle, and there is sufficient case and
text authority to warrant its discard.
It is concluded that all problems involved in a recognition
of the right of privacy and in providing remedial relief by in-
junction may be met. The interesting thing is that in the forty
years which have passed since the publication of the original
article, only nine jurisdictions have definitely passed upon the
acceptance or rejection of the right. Thus this new chapter in
the law is not a long one. But the chapter, although not long,
has vitality; and in a society which shows an increasing interest
in the protection of full personality, it should attain added
importance in the years to come. We are living in an age of
ruthless standardization which has resulted in the suppression
of human individuality. Coupled with this is the exploitation
by the press and advertising agencies of all "human interest"
materials available. The timely recognition by the courts of the
right of privacy may aid in preserving the "self" as an institu-
tion of modern life.
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